Two Concepts of Rules John Rawls The Philosophical Review, 1955 This is part two of our exploration of John Rawls' "Two Concepts of Rules." If you haven't watched part one, we recommend starting there. Now that we understand how Rawls' framework applies to punishment, let's see how he uses this same reasoning for promises. Let's say you promised your friend you'd help them move this weekend, but you suddenly get an offer to go to a concert you've been dying to see. Some might argue that if breaking your promise means more benefit than harm, it's acceptable. But Rawls points out that this thinking misses something fundamental about what promises are. When you promise, you're not just making a prediction about your future behavior; you're participating in a social practice built on trust. Just as baseball isn't baseball without its rules, a promise isn't really a promise if we can break it whenever something better comes along. Just like a baseball player can't decide mid-game that four strikes would be fairer than three, someone making a promise can't rewrite the rules of promise-keeping when they become inconvenient. The practice only works because people trust that promises will be kept, even when circumstances change. Rawls introduces two ways of understanding rules to explain this. The summary view treats rules as convenient guidelines based on past experience. Under this view, rules could be broken whenever breaking them seems beneficial - like a baseball player arguing that the three-strike rule shouldn't apply because they're having an off day. The practice conception, however, sees rules as defining the activity itself. Just as you can't play baseball without accepting the three-strike rule, you can't meaningfully make promises unless you accept the obligation to keep them. This distinction matters profoundly for legal institutions. Just as we saw with punishment, different legal actors have different relationships to these rules. When legislators craft laws about verbal agreements, they consider the broad social benefits of reliable promise-keeping. But when judges interpret contracts or enforce obligations, they must treat the rules of promise-keeping as binding - just like that baseball umpire who has to call strike three. They're not just considering individual cases; they're maintaining the practices that make social and legal interaction possible.