Prigg versus Pennsylvania is a case that involved the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act, which Congress had enacted pursuant to the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article 4 of the Constitution. The question arose, was the Fugitive Slave Act within the power of Congress under the Fugitive Slave Clause. What challengers of that law, like Salmon Chase maintain was that Article 4 did not create any new federal power. The Fugitive Slave Clause is in Section 2 of Article 4 of the original Constitution. Salmon Chase maintained that Section 2 gave Congress no additional powers to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause, it simply said that slaves shall be surrendered up upon demand of the party to whom their service is owed. He contrasted that with Section 1, which did give Congress an enumerated power to implement the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as well as Section 3, which gave Congress an enumerated power to enact all needful regulations to govern the territories. Because Section 2 included no enumerated power, Chase argued that Congress did not have power to enact the Fugitive Slave Clause. In Prigg versus Pennsylvania, Justice Story disagreed. Justice Story adopted an extremely broad reading of Necessary and Proper Clause in which he said that Congress had a power to make laws that would protect any rights that was acknowledged or recognized by the Constitution. It was in fact, a reading of the clause broader than even the post-New Deal reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause that we live with today. What makes Prigg legally objectionable is the fact that it did not hew to the enumerated powers scheme of the original Constitution and instead used what you might call a modern reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause to greatly expand the power of Congress, in this case, to pass a Fugitive Slave Act.