In 1997, golfer Casey Martin sued the PGA Tour for not allowing him to use a golf cart at tournaments. Martin suffered from a circulatory disorder that makes it extremely painful to walk. He cited the Americans with Disability Act as legal reasoning. By 2001, the case had made it to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court had to decide whether the ADA required the PGA Tour to accommodate professional golfers with disabilities and whether using a golf cart would fundamentally alter the game at a tournament. The Court ruled in a 7-2 decision in favor of Martin. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented. In one of his most entertaining and quotable opinions, he clearly expressed the difference between what the law requires and what might be fair or decent (but not required): “In my view today’s opinion exercises a benevolent compassion that the law does not place it within our power to impose.” Scalia takes issue with the majority’s argument about the “fundamental” nature of the game: “It has been rendered the solemn duty of the Supreme Court of the United States, . . . to decide What Is Golf. I am sure that the Framers of the Constitution, aware of the 1457 edict of King James II of Scotland prohibiting golf because it interfered with the practice of archery, fully expected that sooner or later the paths of golf and government, the law and the links, would once again cross, and that the judges of this august Court would some day have to wrestle with that age-old jurisprudential question, for which their years of study in the law have so well prepared them: Is someone riding around a golf course from shot to shot really a golfer? Either out of humility or out of self-respect (one or the other) the Court should decline to answer this incredibly difficult and incredibly silly question.” Justice Scalia made it clear that his objection was not about the handicap of the plaintiff or the relief that he sought: “My belief that today’s judgment is clearly in error should not be mistaken for a belief that the PGA TOUR clearly ought not allow respondent to use a golf cart. That is a close question, on which even those who compete in the PGA TOUR are apparently divided; but it is a different question from the one before the Court. Complaints about this case are not ‘properly directed to Congress,’ . . . They are properly directed to this Court’s Kafkaesque determination that professional sports organizations, and the fields they rent for their exhibitions, are ‘places of public accommodation’ to the competing athletes, and the athletes themselves ‘customers’ of the organization that pays them; its Alice in Wonderland determination that there are such things as judicially determinable ‘essential’ and ‘nonessential’ rules of a made-up game; and its Animal Farm determination that fairness and the ADA mean that everyone gets to play by individualized rules which will assure that no one’s lack of ability (or at least no one’s lack of ability so pronounced that it amounts to a disability) will be a handicap. The year was 2001, and ‘everybody was finally equal.’ “