The idea that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has a robust, serious, important meaning is lying underneath the floorboards of current constitutional law. When the Court talks about it, for instance, in the McDonald versus Chicago case, when the Court talks about the Privileges or Immunities Clause, you get the sense not that they're ignoring the Clause, but really they're more frightened of it. They are worried about what exactly this clause might be doing. They don't really want to mess with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, despite the fact that it occupies this foundational role in its substantive due process case law, they don't want to say anything that is going to cause scholars to jump out of the woodwork and say, "Wait a minute, that's not right." So in 2010, they say, "We understand there's been a lot of criticism about what we said about the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 1873, and we acknowledge that we were wrong in 1873." Scholars agree about very little else other than it doesn't mean what the Court said in 1873. But the Court in McDonald said, "Because there's no consensus, we don't want to mess with the Privileges or Immunities Clause.” And ever since then, this Privileges or Immunities Clause has been in the background. Justice Thomas in 2010 said, "Well, I think I know at least part what the Privileges or Immunities Clause means. It includes the right to keep and bear arms." In cases like Timbs, about the Excessive Fines Clause, Justice Gorsuch has a concurrence saying, "Well, maybe we should shift incorporation from the substantive due process to the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In Gundy versus United States, Justice Gorsuch's dissent mentions the shift from the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Due Process as a mistake that then caused the Due Process Clause to get bigger than it should have been. Chief Justice Roberts actually was on board of that dissent. So it looks like there's three justices who have acknowledged that the error in the Slaughter-House Cases is part of what's driving substantive due process case law. Nobody on the court defends what the court did in 1873. There are a number of justices who are obviously reticent to overrule the Slaughterhouse Cases, but nobody defends it. And really there's nobody on the court insisting that they not overrule it. So if you look at this scorecard of who on the Court has a view about what should be done with the Privileges or Immunities Clause, it seems like it's three to nothing in favor of doing something with it. As newer justices come on the Court, I think there is every prospect of thinking that when they look at the Privileges or Immunities Clause, they are going to think, "Yeah, we should be using this rather than substantive due process to look at unenumerated rights or even incorporation of the Bill of Rights.” Several recent books have come out giving more scholarship about the 14th Amendment, and especially about the Privileges or Immunities Clause. The scholarship on the 14th Amendment is getting ever more accessible to judges. And it seems likely that at some point they are going to confront again the issue of whether they should use the Privileges or Immunities Clause or continue with substantive due process.